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I. Introduction
It is well-documented that the way the Bush administration chose to conduct itsconflict against al Qaeda caused a significant rift between the United States and
European States. US policies that authorized the use of renditions, secret detention
facilities and harsh interrogation techniques created diplomatic tension between
the United States and many of its European allies, making it harder to focus on
other bilateral and multilateral issues and at times diminishing law enforcement
and intelligence cooperation.1 Many of these European reactions and decisions were
discretionary, taken by the political branches of European countries in response to
pressure from their electorates and human rights groups. One might reasonably
think, therefore, that some of the changes introduced by the Obama administra-
tion related to the conflict with al Qaeda—the three January 2009 executive orders,
for instance—would have started to close that rift.2
But something remarkable—and surprisingly unremarked upon—has been
happening since 2001 that is both widening and securing the permanence of this
transatlantic divide. Courts on both sides of the Atlantic are deciding cases
brought by individuals who are contesting the way States have been fighting
armed conflicts with non-State actors (such as the Taliban and al Qaeda, as well as
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armed groups in Iraq). With the exception of individual claims related to the law-
fulness of detention at Guantanamo, the US government has won the vast major-
ity of its cases, with the courts often declining even to reach the merits of the
claim.3 In contrast, European States (with the United Kingdom leading the way)
have lost virtually every case on these issues that has come before their courts or
before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). These cases are having a
systematic effect on States’ decisions about how to conduct themselves in armed
conflict. It therefore is in the interests of policymakers and warfighters to under-
stand this trend.
Part II of this article examines the wide spectrum of cases in which States or
State officials have been sued for their alleged conduct related to non-international
armed conflicts. Part III assesses the real-world implications for the judicial deci-
sions in each area, not only for the specific litigants but also for government policy
and operations more generally. Part IV considers possible explanations for the diver-
gent outcomes of these cases and offers some thoughts about how States might try
to manage these developments in the future.
II. Suing States over How They Fight
Virtually every aspect of the way in which the United States and European States
are fighting conflicts against non-State actors—including detention, the use of
force during occupation, the transfer of detainees from one State to another and
the use of intelligence and intelligence agencies—has been challenged in court.4
These cases stem primarily from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, though
some flow from the US conflict with al Qaeda outside of those theaters and allega-
tions about US activities, such as renditions, in the course of that latter conflict.
This Part examines four categories of claims asserting unlawful actions by States:
unlawful detention, unlawful treatment, unlawful transfers and illegality in intelli-
gence activities. Each section focuses first on US cases and then turns to other
States’ cases, most often cases brought in the United Kingdom.
Claims of Unlawful Detention
US Cases
It is useful to sort into three general categories claims brought by detainees against
the United States alleging that they are being unlawfully detained. First, detainees
have challenged the executive branch’s general authority to detain al Qaeda and
Taliban fighters under the laws of war. US courts have upheld the executive’s au-
thority in this area. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court upheld the legality of
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detention of individuals engaged in hostilities against the United States in Afghani-
stan, while requiring the US government to provide the individual detainee in
question with a process by which to contest the factual basis for his detention.5
Likewise, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court affirmed that the United
States was in an armed conflict with al Qaeda and did not question the legality of
Hamdan’s detention as a member of al Qaeda (though it concluded that the military
commission before which the United States planned to try him was unlawful).6
Second, detainees have sought to have federal courts, not just the executive
branch, review the legality of their detentions. The United States, which has argued
against the extension of review to courts, has lost these cases. The chain of cases
that resulted in the Supreme Court’s holding that constitutional habeas corpus
applies to detainees held at Guantanamo includes Rasul v. Bush and Boumediene
v. Bush.7
The Boumediene decision resulted in a third category of cases: detainees at
Guantanamo have brought habeas petitions challenging the specific factual bases
for their detentions. The United States is defending almost two hundred habeas
cases brought by those who remain at Guantanamo, and has lost a number of cases,
even as the courts continue to uphold the basic scope of the government’s claimed
detention authority.8 Much ink has been spilled about the unprecedented nature of
judicial review of the propriety of a person’s detention during an armed conflict.
Indeed, the fact that the federal district courts hearing these cases are struggling
with what rules to apply to this review illustrates the novel nature of the courts’ role
in this type of decision making and the non-traditional nature of the armed
conflict.9 The outcomes of these cases have been mixed: the courts (to date) have
denied detainees the writ of habeas in about sixteen cases, and have granted it in
thirty-seven cases.10 As a result, the United States has transferred a number of de-
tainees to their countries of nationality or other locations, and in other cases con-
tinues to seek homes for those ordered released.
In Boumediene, the Supreme Court evaluated three factors to determine the
reach of the writ of habeas in the wartime detention context: “(1) the citizenship
and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that sta-
tus determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and
then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the
prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.”11
One question left unresolved by Boumediene was whether the right of habeas
corpus might extend to detainees held in US custody in locations other than
Guantanamo.
In May 2010, the D.C. Circuit answered this question in the negative in the
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applied the three Boumediene factors to determine whether the writ would run to
the detention in Afghanistan by the United States of three non-Afghan detainees
who alleged that the United States apprehended them outside of Afghanistan. The
Maqaleh court concluded that the writ did not run to those detainees, holding that
“under both Eisentrager and Boumediene, the writ does not extend to the Bagram
confinement in an active theater of war in a territory under neither the de facto nor
de jure sovereignty of the United States and within the territory of another de jure
sovereign.”13 In reaching this conclusion, the court expressed concern about an in-
terpretation of the Suspension Clause that would “create the potential for the ex-
traterritorial extension of the Suspension Clause to noncitizens held in any United
States military facility in the world, and perhaps to an undeterminable number of
other United States–leased facilities as well.”14 The court thus determined that it
lacked jurisdiction to hear the detainees’ claims.15 This holding—in a case in which
the detainees were not Afghan nationals and in which they alleged that they were
not apprehended in Afghanistan—suggests that it is even more unlikely that US
courts would conclude that habeas would extend to detainees such as Afghan
nationals apprehended in Afghanistan during the current conflict.
While it is possible to imagine a future US detention facility that falls between
Guantanamo and Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan on the spectrum of the
Boumediene factors, for now it appears as though Guantanamo detainees are sui
generis in being alien wartime detainees entitled to federal court review of their de-
tentions. Courts thus have left it to the executive branch to determine whether,
outside of Guantanamo, a particular individual’s detention during armed conflict
is lawful.
UK Cases
The UK case of al-Jedda, another case about the legality of a detention during non-
international armed conflict, stands in some contrast to Maqaleh.16 The ECtHR
held a merits hearing on June 9, 2010, so its ultimate disposition remains uncertain.
However, the UK House of Lords decision is worth considering both for its holding
and because it illustrates the complicated expansion of the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR)17 into warfighting for States parties to that Convention.
The larger implications for that expansion are discussed in Part III.
The UK armed forces in Iraq detained Mr. al-Jedda, a dual British-Iraqi na-
tional, for several years as a “security internee.” Al-Jedda challenged his detention,
claiming it violated ECHR Article 5, which defines the situations in which a State
lawfully can deprive a person of his liberty, and which does not include security de-
tention.18 The UK government pursued two main lines of argument. First, it
argued that al-Jedda’s detention was attributable not to the United Kingdom but to
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the UN, which had authorized a multinational force to take action in Iraq. Second,
it argued that his detention was authorized by UN Security Council Resolution
1546 (UNSCR 1546), which contemplated detention “for imperative reasons of
security,”19 and that the Resolution therefore qualified al-Jedda’s rights under
ECHR Article 5 (and under the UK’s Human Rights Act (HRA), which imple-
mented the ECHR in UK law).
The House of Lords rejected the UK’s first argument but accepted—in part—its
second. The Law Lords determined that Article 103 of the UN Charter, which pro-
vides that a State’s obligations under the Charter prevail over any other of the
State’s international obligations, qualified the UK’s obligations under ECHR Arti-
cle 5.20 However, the Lords made clear that UNSCR 1546 did not supplant Article 5
entirely. One lord’s opinion stated, “[T]he UK may lawfully, where it is necessary
for imperative reasons of security, exercise the power to detain authorised by
UNSCR 1546 and successive resolutions, but must ensure that the detainee’s rights
under article 5 are not infringed to any greater extent than is inherent in such de-
tention.”21 Another lord noted that the scope of UNSCR 1546 and the way the Res-
olution might interact with Article 5’s requirements were not clear and that the
issue would remain for decision in future proceedings.22 Three of the five Lords ex-
pressed discomfort with security detention generally; one suggested that the
United Kingdom bring al-Jedda back to the United Kingdom and another favored
criminal proceedings, viewing security detention only as a fallback. (Both of these
positions are in tension with the view under the law of war that security detention
in the location in which the conflict is occurring is acceptable.)
The House of Lords thus considered that it had jurisdiction to review al-Jedda’s
claims, in contrast to the D.C. Circuit in Maqaleh. Further, while it upheld al-
Jedda’s detention as lawful, it held that UNSCR 1546 qualifies the applicability of
ECHR Article 5, but only to the extent necessary to give effect to the obligations in
UNSCR 1546. In other words, Article 5 continues to apply to the UK’s security
detentions to the greatest extent possible consistent with the Resolution. It remains
to be seen whether the ECtHR will take a similar or more expansive view of the ex-
tent to which the UK’s obligations under the ECHR must govern its treatment of its
detainees during armed conflicts outside UK territory.23
Claims of Unlawful Detainee Treatment
Another category of claims against States fighting non-international armed con-
flicts is claims that detainees in these States’ custody suffered mistreatment at the
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US Cases
Individuals detained as suspected members of al Qaeda or the Taliban have
brought a number of cases in US courts seeking declaratory relief and damages for
their alleged abuse while in US custody. Some have tried to sue US government of-
ficials, while others have tried to sue US contractors.24 None has succeeded to date;
further, the courts have resolved the cases in a way that has avoided addressing the
underlying substantive claims.
In Rasul v. Rumsfeld, four former Guantanamo detainees sued former Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and ten other senior military officials, seeking dam-
ages for their detention and alleged mistreatment while in that facility.25 They
claimed that they were subjected to beatings, sleep deprivation, extreme tempera-
tures, forced nudity, death threats and interrogations at gunpoint. Their claims al-
leged violations of the US Constitution and international law, including the 1949
Geneva Conventions. In 2008, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the case; the Supreme
Court granted certiorari, vacated and remanded for further consideration in light
of Boumediene.26 On remand, the D.C. Circuit again dismissed the case, holding
that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.27 In addition to holding
that “[n]o reasonable government official would have been on notice that plaintiffs
had any Fifth Amendment or Eighth Amendment rights,” the court also expressed
its view that “the Court in Boumediene disclaimed any intention to disturb existing
law governing the extraterritorial reach of any constitutional provisions, other
than the Suspension Clause.”28 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2009.
Likewise, in Arar v. Ashcroft, Maher Arar sued the former Attorney General and
other US officials, claiming that they had violated the Torture Victims Protection
Act and Arar’s Fifth Amendment rights by authorizing his removal to Syria with-
out appropriate process and with the knowledge that the Syrian government would
detain and torture him.29 The Second Circuit, sitting en banc, declined to create a
new Bivens damages remedy against the government officials allegedly responsible
for his transfer. The Second Circuit described the diplomatic, foreign policy, classi-
fied information and national security implications of allowing damage claims for
harms suffered during renditions as among the “special factors” counseling against
the extension of a Bivens action to this type of activity.30 The court concluded,
[W]e decline to create, on our own, a new cause of action against officers and employ-
ees of the federal government. Rather, we conclude that, when a case presents the in-
tractable “special factors” apparent here, . . . it is for the Executive in the first instance to
decide how to implement extraordinary rendition, and for the elected members of
Congress—and not for us as judges—to decide whether an individual may seek com-
pensation from government officers and employees directly, or from the government,
for a constitutional violation.31
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The court thus deferred to the political branches in assessing whether and how to
create such a remedy.
In this context, it is worth mentioning Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. While that case was
about the legality of the military commissions created to try Mr. Hamdan, and not
about his treatment in detention, the Supreme Court’s decision that Common Arti-
cle 3 of the Geneva Conventions applied to the US conflict with al Qaeda had a direct
effect on the rules governing the US government’s treatment and interrogation of
al Qaeda (and Taliban) detainees. One might therefore view this case as an example
that runs counter to the primary thesis of this article, because a US court waded
into an issue that forced it to examine what rules the executive branch must apply
to military operations during an armed conflict. However, it is possible to view the
case as one whose core issues were squarely of the type that courts usually adjudi-
cate: the interpretation of two US statutes (the Uniform Code of Military Justice
and the Detainee Treatment Act) and the parameters of a fair trial, with the hold-
ing’s implications for broader treatment issues an important second-order effect.
Indeed, even though the US government asked the courts to abstain from consider-
ing the merits of the case, its primary argument was that the courts should abstain
until the military justice process ran its course, not that the issue was a political
question inappropriate for judicial review.32
UK Cases
In contrast, the UK courts allowed a comparable case of alleged detainee abuse in
Iraq by UK forces to proceed, with Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) conceding
that the ECHR applied to an Iraqi detainee who had been killed while in its cus-
tody. In al-Skeini v. Secretary of State for Defence, family members of six Iraqi civil-
ians killed in Iraq brought cases against HMG.33 In each case, a member of the UK
armed forces had killed the individual at a time when the United Kingdom was an
occupying power in Basra, Iraq. Five of the individuals were killed during UK patrols
or raids on houses; the sixth, Baha Mousa, was detained and beaten to death in UK
custody. The Iraqis’ claims were based on the UK’s HRA, a law that requires those
bringing cases under the law to show that the UK government acted in a manner
incompatible with an ECHR right of the claimant or deceased.34 The individuals
claimed that the UK’s actions violated its procedural obligations under Articles 2
(right to life) and 3 (right not to be subjected to torture) of the ECHR (and the cor-
responding parts of the HRA) to investigate violations thereof.35
The UK government argued that the HRA did not apply to UK government ac-
tions outside its borders.36 With regard to Mr. Mousa, however, the UK government
conceded that, while he was in UK detention, Mr. Mousa was within its jurisdic-
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conceded this, the al-Skeini court did not discuss the issue in any depth. Several
scholars have noted the uncertainty as to the precise basis for the House of Lords’
holding regarding Mousa; it “was apparently premised on some special jurisdic-
tion that the United Kingdom was said to have over its military prisons abroad, not
on the fact of direct physical control over Mr Baha Mousa.”38 In any event, this
concession by the UK government suggests that the United Kingdom will treat
future overseas detentions during armed conflict or peacekeeping operations as
being covered by the ECHR unless there is a specific UN Security Council resolu-
tion in place that would “trump” the UK’s ECHR obligations.39 As with al-Jedda,
the ECtHR is hearing the al-Skeini case, so the case’s ultimate outcome remains
unresolved.
Claims of Unlawful Detainee Transfers
In another series of suits filed in regard to conduct taking place during non-
international armed conflicts, detainees have asked courts to enjoin their transfers
from the custody of the State holding them to the custody of another State. Detain-
ees who had been in US (and Canadian) custody have lost their cases; based upon
the approach of the UK courts and the ECtHR to date, the detainees who are or
were in UK custody seem likely to win theirs.
US Cases
In 2006, two US nationals held by Multi-National Forces–Iraq (MNF-I) filed peti-
tions for habeas corpus in US court, asking the court to block their transfer by
MNF-I to Iraqi officials (who had issued arrest warrants for them).40 The Supreme
Court, hearing their consolidated cases as Munaf v. Geren, considered “whether
United States district courts may exercise their habeas jurisdiction to enjoin our
Armed Forces from transferring individuals detained within another sovereign’s
territory to that sovereign’s government for criminal prosecution.”41 The Court
concluded that, although US courts had statutory habeas jurisdiction over the indi-
viduals (presumably because they were US citizens), those courts could not grant
the remedy sought.42
Although not the sole basis for its holding, the Court took into account the fact
that the individuals were captured in the context of an ongoing conflict. The Court
considered other cases in which the United States had transferred US citizens to
foreign countries for trial and remarked:
Neither Neely nor Wilson concerned individuals captured and detained within an ally’s
territory during ongoing hostilities involving our troops. Neely involved a charge of
embezzlement; Wilson the peacetime actions of a serviceman. Yet in those cases we held
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that the Constitution allows the Executive to transfer American citizens to foreign
authorities for criminal prosecution. It would be passing strange to hold that the Exec-
utive lacks that same authority where, as here, the detainees were captured by our
Armed Forces for engaging in serious hostile acts against an ally in what the Govern-
ment refers to as “an active theater of combat.” . . . Such a conclusion would implicate
not only concerns about interfering with a sovereign’s recognized prerogative to apply
its criminal law to those alleged to have committed crimes within its borders, but also
concerns about unwarranted judicial intrusion into the Executive’s ability to conduct
military operations abroad.43
Thus, the Court concluded that it could not enjoin US armed forces from transfer-
ring individuals detained within Iraq’s territory to the Iraqi government for crimi-
nal prosecution.
Guantanamo detainees have been no more successful in suing to block their
transfers to other countries. In a case known as “Kiyemba II,” the D.C. Circuit held
that Munaf controlled to bar courts from granting writs of habeas corpus to block
transfers of detainees from the United States to foreign countries, even when those
being transferred would face continued detention or prosecution under the receiv-
ing country’s laws.44 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2010.45 Federal
judges thus lack the authority to block, even temporarily, the transfer of a detainee
from Guantanamo to another country. This allows the US government to decide
without judicial interference where and when to send detainees, as long as the
United States acts consistently with its own policy not to transfer a detainee to a
place where he is more likely than not to face torture.46 US courts thus remain wary
in this context of conducting inquiries into the legal process or treatment that an
individual will face upon transfer, while leaving open the possibility that they
would do so if it were manifest that the individual would be tortured if transferred.
Canadian Case
On facts similar to Munaf, Canada’s courts took a similarly skeptical view about the
propriety of blocking transfers from a detaining State to a territorial State, at least
where an agreed treatment framework was in place. In 2007, Amnesty Interna-
tional sued Canada to prevent Canadian troops in Afghanistan from transferring
detainees to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRoA). It was claimed that IRoA
mistreats detainees, which means that such transfers violated Canada’s constitu-
tion. A Canadian federal judge concluded in 2008 that Afghan detainees were not
entitled to protection under the Canadian Charter and dismissed Amnesty Inter-
national’s claim.47 The Canadian Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the
Canadian forces lacked “effective control” over Afghan territory; that the Canadian
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to the application of the Canadian Charter over Afghan nationals; and that instead
the Canadian government and IRoA expressly identified international law as the
law governing treatment of detainees in Canadian custody.48
UK Cases
The ECtHR has been far less deferential to the laws and prerogatives of foreign sover-
eigns and to the diplomatic judgments of the ministries of States parties, including—
but not limited to—situations in which a State seeks to transfer to another country
a detainee picked up in a non-international armed conflict.
Al-Saadoon v. United Kingdom offers a current example.49 Although the UK
government won the case in its domestic courts, the case came out the opposite
way from Munaf, on similar facts, in the ECtHR.50 The UK courts deemed it lawful
for the United Kingdom to transfer to Iraqi authorities for trial two Iraqi murder
suspects.51 The individuals faced the death penalty under Iraqi law and sued to
block their transfer from UK custody, claiming that it would violate the ECHR pro-
hibitions against the death penalty and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.
The UK Court of Appeal concluded that the individuals were not within the UK’s
jurisdiction for purposes of the application of the ECHR, considering an interna-
tional arrangement between the United Kingdom and the government of Iraq re-
garding the allocation of legal and physical custody of detainees.52
The individuals appealed to the ECtHR, which held that the transfer breached
the ECHR.53 The Court first concluded (in its opinion on the admissibility of the
case) that the applicants were within the jurisdiction of the ECHR.54 On the merits,
the Court held that the death penalty could be considered inhuman and degrading
and contrary to Article 3 of the Convention and that there were substantial
grounds for believing that there was a real risk of the applicants’ being sentenced
to death and executed.55 (The United Kingdom had not sought death penalty as-
surances from Iraq.) Although HMG argued that it had no option but to respect
Iraqi sovereignty and transfer the applicants who were Iraqi nationals held on
Iraqi territory to the custody of the Iraqi courts when so requested, the Court was
not satisfied that the United Kingdom had done all it could have to secure the ap-
plicants’ rights under the Convention, including by trying to negotiate death pen-
alty assurances with the Iraqi government.56 In contrast to the US Supreme
Court’s deference to the Iraqi legal system and Iraq’s decision to prosecute some-
one alleged to have broken Iraqi law, the ECtHR stated, “There was no obligation
under either Iraqi domestic law or international law which required either for the
applicants’ cases to be referred to the Iraqi criminal courts or for them to be reclas-
sified as criminal detainees.”57 The Court concluded unanimously that there had
been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention over the UK’s objections that “a
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finding that a Contracting State was under an obligation to secure the Convention
rights and freedoms when acting territorially and outside the regional space of the
Convention gave rise to real conceptual, practical and legal difficulties.”58
The Court’s ruling makes clear that a European country cannot transfer a person
in its custody to another government’s custody where there are substantial grounds
for believing there is a real risk of the person’s being subjected to ill-treatment, even
during an armed conflict and even where the transferring government is holding
the individual in another State’s territory and seeking to transfer the individual to
the custody of the territorial State. It is particularly notable that the ECtHR con-
cluded that the transfer was unlawful even where the detainees at issue were Iraqi
nationals (rather than the nationality of the forces holding them, that is, British).
Further, the ECtHR ordered the UK government to undertake particular diplo-
matic steps, despite the UK government’s unambiguous assessment that doing so
would have an adverse diplomatic effect. Thus, unlike the courts in Munaf and
Kiyemba II, the ECtHR concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the underlying
allegations and reached a decision on the substance of those allegations.
Finally, in a case involving the conflict in Afghanistan, the United Kingdom
faced a suit by former UK detainees in Afghanistan challenging a UK policy per-
mitting transfers of detainees to the Afghan National Directorate of Security
(NDS).59 The detainees claimed that they were subjected to torture after they were
transferred, and that their transfers therefore violated ECHR Article 3.60 The UK
court concluded that HMG could continue to transfer detainees to two NDS facili-
ties if it met a number of conditions, but could not transfer detainees to a third
NDS facility.61 Again, in contrast to the decisions of US courts in Munaf and
Kiyemba II, the UK court concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the underlying
allegations and reached a decision on the merits based on an in-depth probe of
those allegations. Although the UK court concluded that at least some UK transfers
could continue and was more deferential to diplomatic judgments by HMG than
the ECtHR, it seems likely that the claimants will appeal the decision first within
the UK court system and subsequently to the ECtHR (if they continue to lose in
UK courts).
Claims about Illegality in Intelligence Activities
Yet another category of litigation has raised hard questions for courts: litigation in
which the heart of the case implicates classified intelligence information or relates
to the activities of intelligence agencies. At times, this means that the litigation may
implicate intelligence relationships between States, which are by definition highly
sensitive. Of particular interest in this category of litigation is the direct interplay
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US Cases
Two recent cases in US courts bear mention: el-Masri v. United States and Mohamed
v. Jeppesen Dataplan.62 The US executive branch invoked the “state secrets” privi-
lege as a way to avoid litigating both cases. When the US government invokes that
privilege, the head of the agency whose activities are at issue files an affidavit stating
that the litigation, if allowed to proceed, might disclose information that could en-
danger national security.
In el-Masri, the plaintiff sued the former director of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), three aviation companies and unnamed intelligence agents, alleging
that the CIA detained him in Macedonia and flew him to a detention facility in
Afghanistan where he was abused, before the CIA realized it had detained the
wrong person and released him. El-Masri claimed this violated the US Constitution
and international norms prohibiting arbitrary detention and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment.63
The Fourth Circuit dismissed the case, concluding that even though US govern-
ment officials had discussed the rendition program publicly at a high level of gener-
ality, secret information formed “the very subject matter” of the program.
Specifically, the court noted that the state secrets privilege attaches and may bar the
entire proceedings where “there is a reasonable danger that [the information’s]
disclosure will expose military (or diplomatic or intelligence) matters which, in the
interest of national security, should not be divulged” and where “the circum-
stances make clear that privileged information will be so central to the litigation
that any attempt to proceed will threaten that information’s disclosure.”64 The
court concluded:
[W]e must reject El-Masri’s view that the existence of public reports concerning his al-
leged rendition (and the CIA’s rendition program in general) should have saved his
Complaint from dismissal. Even if we assume, arguendo, that the state secrets privilege
does not apply to the information that media outlets have published concerning those
topics, dismissal of his Complaint would nonetheless be proper because the public in-
formation does not include the facts that are central to litigating his action. Rather,
those central facts—the CIA means and methods that form the subject matter of El-
Masri’s claim—remain state secrets.65
The Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari in 2008.
In Jeppesen, the Ninth Circuit, in a closely decided en banc opinion, took the
same approach to the privilege. Five foreign nationals sued a subsidiary of Boeing,
claiming that the subsidiary provided planes, flight planning and logistical support
to the CIA to render individuals to “black sites,” knowing that they would be mis-
treated by US and foreign officials. The United States intervened, invoking the state
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secrets privilege and arguing that the court must dismiss the entire action. An affi-
davit by former CIA Director Hayden stated, “Disclosure of the information cov-
ered by this privilege assertion reasonably could be expected to cause serious—and
in some instances, exceptionally grave—damage to the national security of the
United States and, therefore, the information should be excluded from any use in
this case.”66 The US government and the defendants relied on precedent holding
that “a suit predicated on the existence and content of a secret agreement between a
plaintiff and the government must be dismissed on the pleadings because the ‘very
subject matter’ of the suit is secret.”67
A Ninth Circuit panel rejected that view, concluding that it was not appropriate
to stop the lawsuit at its outset, but the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the
state secrets privilege required dismissal of the plaintiffs’ case.68 In discussing its
role in evaluating the claim of the privilege, the court struck a balance between def-
erence to the executive branch and the need to provide some objective review of
the invocation of the privilege. It stated,
In evaluating the need for secrecy, “we acknowledge the need to defer to the Executive
on matters of foreign policy and national security and surely cannot legitimately find
ourselves second guessing the Executive in this arena.” But “the state secrets doctrine
does not represent a surrender of judicial control over access to the courts.” Rather, “to
ensure that the state secrets privilege is asserted no more frequently and sweepingly
than necessary, it is essential that the courts continue critically to examine instances of
its invocation.”69
Thus, in the face of highly controversial alleged US government activity, two cir-
cuit courts have taken a reasonably broad reading of the state secrets privilege, dis-
missing the cases at the pleading stage at the request of the US executive branch to
avoid revealing in litigation sensitive evidence that would impact national security.
UK Cases
UK courts, by contrast, have been less sympathetic to the government’s interests in
protecting intelligence information, a fact that seems likely to affect UK policies
moving forward. This is illustrated by recent decisions in three cases: a case
brought against the UK government by a UK resident, Binyam Mohamed, to ob-
tain information about his alleged treatment by the United Kingdom and United
States; cases brought by Mohamed and several other former Guantanamo detain-
ees seeking damages from the UK government; and a case brought by Mohamed
and others against Jeppesen UK.
The Binyam Mohamed litigation to obtain intelligence information was proce-
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in a military commission, sued the UK government to obtain any information it
had received from the United States about his detention and interrogation. He
claimed that he was detained in Pakistan, mistreated there, then moved by the
United States to Morocco and Afghanistan, mistreated there, and ultimately sent to
Guantanamo. He also claimed that the UK intelligence agencies knew where he
was, provided to US intelligence officials questions to ask him, and received inter-
view reports from the United States. Mohamed’s stated goal of obtaining the infor-
mation was to allow him fully to defend himself in the military commission.
Although the US government subsequently dropped the military charges
against Mohamed and shared the relevant material in redacted form with
Mohamed’s habeas attorneys, a UK court ultimately ordered HMG to disclose cer-
tain secret information to his lawyers, and the press then sought to obtain that in-
formation. In 2009, the court concluded that the intelligence documents detailing
Mohamed’s treatment should not be published, based in part on “threats” by the
United States to withhold from the United Kingdom future intelligence sharing.
To that end, the court redacted seven paragraphs in its judgment that described the
information the United Kingdom received from the United States regarding
Mohamed’s treatment during interrogation. That court subsequently reconsid-
ered its decision, ordering the seven paragraphs to be made public.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed, notwithstanding HMG’s assertion that
“the intelligence relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States
is by far the most significant relationship the United Kingdom has from the point
of view of internal security and the protection of broader international interest”71
and that revealing the intelligence information from the United States would be
“profoundly damaging to the interests” of the United Kingdom.72 Indeed, the
United States itself, under both the Bush and Obama administrations, had as-
serted that the release of this information would adversely affect the intelligence
relationship.73 The basis for the Court of Appeal’s decision was its view that the in-
formation contained in the seven paragraphs already was public; it concluded that
the United States had conceded that it had mistreated Mohamed, based on lan-
guage in a public habeas decision reflecting that Mohamed had alleged torture and
that the United States had not contested those allegations.74 The Court of Appeal
also cited the importance of “open justice,”75 evidenced a skepticism that the
Obama administration really would withhold important intelligence information
from a close ally76 and stated its own view that the information in the seven para-
graphs would not undercut the UK’s national security77 in concluding that the
paragraphs should be made public.
This decision is notable for at least three reasons. First, it illustrates the use of
one State’s courts to obtain information for use in another State’s courts. Second, it
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highlights a willingness by UK courts to look behind the UK government’s national
security judgments, even when the government has made clear its strong belief that
a particular judgment will affect its ability to obtain future intelligence from its
most important ally and that ally has made explicit on the record its views about the
release of the information. Third, it illustrates that decisions in US habeas cases
may have implications for foreign litigation. As noted above, all three Court of Ap-
peal judges were influenced by their belief that the United States had, by choosing
not to challenge Mohamed’s allegations of mistreatment in another Guantanamo
detainee’s habeas case, effectively conceded that he had been tortured, thus making
it far less important to preserve the secrecy of the seven paragraphs describing
Mohamed’s treatment.
The ongoing Jeppesen litigation reveals a similar interplay between litigation in
US and UK courts. As noted above, Mohamed and four other defendants sued
Jeppesen Dataplan in a US court. They also are suing a related subsidiary, Jeppesen
UK, in a UK court. In July 2009, Jeppesen UK agreed to let the civil case brought by
Mohamed go to trial.78 Mohamed’s counsel believe that, as a result, confidential in-
formation about his alleged rendition will become public, which likely will prove
relevant to the US litigation.
Some of the same detainees filed a civil lawsuit against the United Kingdom,
seeking compensation for the alleged complicity of UK authorities, including MI5
and MI6, in their torture and unlawful detentions. The UK government filed a re-
sponse asking whether, in principle, the UK common law was sufficiently flexible
to enable a court hearing on civil claims for damages to rely on a process whereby
there would be parallel open and closed pleadings, disclosure, witness statements
and hearings. The trial would be partly open and partly closed, as would the judg-
ment. In the open elements of the proceedings, claimants’ counsel would represent
them in the normal way; for the closed elements, special advocates with security
clearances would protect their interests but could not discuss the classified infor-
mation with the claimants. In May 2010, the UK Court of Appeal held that such a
closed procedure was not available in principle, in large part because
the principle that a litigant should be able to see and hear all the evidence which is seen
and heard by a court determining his case is so fundamental, so embedded in the com-
mon law, that, in the absence of parliamentary authority, no judge should override it,
at any rate in relation to an ordinary civil claim, unless (perhaps) all parties to the claim
agree otherwise.79
The United Kingdom sought permission to appeal to the UK Supreme Court.
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itself as faced with an impossible choice between, on the one hand, withholding
many documents that the United Kingdom would like and need to use to counter
the allegations of misconduct by its officials and therefore allow the court to try the
case fairly, and, on the other, disclosing all of those documents and thereby causing
damage to the UK’s national security interests. The UK government’s other op-
tion—to seek public interest immunity certificates for as many as 140,000 docu-
ments—would have been incredibly time-consuming and seemed totally
impractical.80 Given the conundrum in which it found itself, it is not surprising
that the United Kingdom announced in November 2010 that it settled the case
with Mohamed and six other former Guantanamo detainees, reportedly for mil-
lions of pounds.81 In addition, the UK plans to seek a “judicial inquiry” about its
possible role in facilitating US renditions.82 Any revelations in that inquiry seem
likely to lead to further litigation (in both UK and US courts), unless the inquiry’s
findings remain confidential.
Canadian/Swedish Cases
Canada took a very different approach than the United States in dealing with alle-
gations that its government contributed to the transfer of Mr. Arar to Syria, where
he claims he was tortured. A judicial inquiry in Canada concluded that the United
States expelled Arar to Syria based on false assertions from the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police to US officials that Arar was linked to al Qaeda. Canada paid Arar
C$10.5 million to settle his litigation and the Prime Minister issued him an apol-
ogy.83 Likewise, Sweden paid three million kronor to Ahmed Agiza, an individual
allegedly handed over by Sweden to the CIA and rendered to Egypt, where he was
mistreated.84 Although the United States has come under pressure to compensate
Arar too, it has declined to do so.
III. Real-World Effects of Litigation Wins and Losses
Having reviewed the types of cases that individuals have brought and seen the
sharp divergences in the outcomes of litigation in the United States and European
States, one must ask: Does the litigation matter? Have the outcomes of these cases
had a real effect on how these States fight conflicts? The answer is a clear yes, both
for the States that are parties to the litigation, and for third States.
Claims of Unlawful Detention
Litigation regarding unlawful detention has had an impact on both the United
States and European States, though the impact is not the same for each group. As
an immediate matter, courts have ordered the United States to transfer a number
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of detainees as a result of the Guantanamo habeas litigation. The litigation has had
other, less direct effects as well. First, it has forced the judicial branch to opine on
the scope of people whom the United States legally may detain, a decision that, be-
fore Boumediene, largely was in the hands of the executive. The developing habeas
caselaw thus narrows the executive branch’s discretion, at least with regard to those
detained at Guantanamo and arguably with regard to anyone the United States is
detaining pursuant to the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force.85 That
said, the district courts have only narrowed slightly the US government’s asserted
definition of who it can detain at Guantanamo.86
Second and relatedly, the litigation appears to have affected—at least on paper—
the type of person the United States is choosing to detain in Afghanistan. Subse-
quent to the US filing on March 13, 2009, in which the government proffered its
view of the scope of its detention authority over Guantanamo detainees, the
Department of Defense modified its detention policy in Afghanistan to track that
definition.87 It is unclear the extent to which this change has affected whom the
United States is detaining in Afghanistan, however.88 Third, the fact that the judi-
ciary has upheld the continued detention of some at Guantanamo may be having a
positive effect in that it illustrates to those who are highly skeptical of the executive
branch’s arguments about whom it is detaining that another branch of govern-
ment, seen as more neutral, is affirming the legality of some of the detentions.
For the United Kingdom and other States parties to the ECHR, the scope of their
ability to conduct security detentions during armed conflict and the procedures
that they must provide to those they detain remain unsettled. There does not ap-
pear to be public information about how the United Kingdom has implemented
the holdings of al-Skeini and al-Jedda on the ground, perhaps in part because the
United Kingdom is no longer detaining anyone in Iraq. However, the al-Jedda de-
cision makes it quite likely that the United Kingdom and other European States
will push hard to obtain UN Security Council resolutions in advance of using force
abroad. Further, European States may begin to seek specific authorization to de-
tain (rather than a more general authorization to take “all necessary measures”), to
make plain that the right to conduct security detentions is authorized under a par-
ticular UN Charter Chapter VII resolution. Obtaining a Security Council resolu-
tion could at least narrow the scope of application of human rights law to activities
in armed conflict, but it will not obviate the need for the United Kingdom (and
possibly other States parties to the ECHR) to consider ECHR requirements, partic-
ularly given the admonitions of several Law Lords that at least part of ECHR Article
5 remains intact in the face of UNSCR 1546, which authorized States to take all
necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of the security and stability of
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ECHR Article 5, as authorized by ECHR Article 15, though a State that decided to
do so would face high political costs.
Presumably ECHR States parties also will consider carefully whether—and
how—to act in accordance with other ECHR rights, such as the right to life and the
right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment (either by the ECHR
State party that initially detains the person or by another State to which the first
State transfers the person), during armed conflict and peacekeeping operations.89
Even if States conclude that they do not have legal obligations to apply the
ECHR in most overseas situations—a view that generally would be consistent with
the language in Bankovic v. Belgium—they may begin to do so as a matter of policy
and prudence. For example, it might be that the transfer rule that the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) established in Afghanistan (that is, that ISAF
forces would transfer detainees to the Afghan government within 96 hours of de-
taining them) was crafted by ISAF States with an eye toward ECtHR Article 5
caselaw. (In Brogan v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR concluded that a particular de-
tention by the United Kingdom—in which UK officials held a person for 103 hours
without bringing him before a judge or releasing him—violated ECHR Article 5.90
Those crafting the 96-hour rule may have been trying to estimate a pre-court
detention length that the ECtHR would find acceptable.)
These considerations—and the ability of individuals affected by armed conflict
to bring cases directly against the governments for alleged violations of domestic or
international law—mean that European States increasingly are inclined to take a
more cautious approach to detention. European ISAF forces are choosing to detain
few enemy fighters, and some States ultimately ceased to detain any, even while
their troops remained present in Afghanistan.91 This poses problems for force pro-
tection and intelligence collection, and places practical burdens on forces. The
most obvious problem with a very cautious use of detention is that it leaves many
individuals known to be hostile to ISAF forces—including those caught shooting
at or bombing those forces or Afghan civilians—free to engage in the same kind of
conduct over and over. This makes the already dangerous job of an ISAF soldier
even more dangerous, and it arguably delays the ability of ISAF forces to provide
security to Afghans, something most ISAF States agree is an important element of
reconstruction. A reluctance to detain inadvertently can provide incentives to kill
rather than capture—not a desirable outcome from an intelligence or counterin-
surgency point of view. The 96-hour rule also hinders intelligence collection. This
is not to suggest that ISAF and Afghan authorities should not pursue the goal of
prosecuting individuals to the extent possible, but it is to suggest that concerns
about litigation in this context are adversely affecting ISAF’s work.
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Claims of Unlawful Treatment
As noted above, US courts have not handed victories to plaintiffs who sued govern-
ment officials based on allegations that those officials had a hand in their mistreat-
ment. Thus, these cases have had little practical effect on the US government,
though of course events such as the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib and other revela-
tions of detainee mistreatment shone a harsh spotlight on US detention practices and
resulted in both legislation (such as the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005)92 and execu-
tive orders (such as Executive Order 13491,93 drafted to ensure that all US employees
and agents treat detainees in a manner consistent with Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions).
In contrast, a case such as al-Skeini seems likely to have a significant impact on
the UK government. The concession by the UK government that the ECHR applies
to its detention facilities in foreign war zones suggests that the United Kingdom
may be inclined to treat all future overseas detentions during armed conflict or
peacekeeping operations as being covered by the ECHR. Some questions remain
unanswered, such as whether the ECtHR’s caselaw on what constitutes “cruel, in-
human, or degrading” detention conditions in the United Kingdom sets a baseline
for conditions at UK overseas detention facilities and, per the Soering principle, for
conditions in the facilities to which the United Kingdom seeks to transfer someone.94
At the very least, the ECHR’s requirement that a State party conduct an “indepen-
dent and impartial” investigation into an alleged violation of the ECHR would attach
to any alleged violations that took place in UK detention facilities abroad.95
Claims of Unlawful Transfer
The real-world impact of the transfer litigation in US courts is minimal. In view of
Munaf and Kiyemba II, the only principle with which the United States must comply
when transferring a detainee picked up in a non-international armed conflict is
one that the United States already follows: it cannot transfer a person when it is
more likely than not that he will be tortured.96 The other aspects of a transfer—the
identity of the receiving State, the conditions under which the person will be trans-
ferred and the timing of transfer—are left to the executive branch.
Even though Canada won its Afghan transfer litigation, the case arguably still
had a chilling effect on Canada’s actions during armed conflict. From November
2007 to February 2008, pending Amnesty International’s request for an interim in-
junction against transfers, Canada chose not to transfer detainees to the Afghans,
presumably relying instead on short-term, ad hoc detention arrangements.97 A top
Canadian general stated publicly that if Canada lost the Amnesty International
case, Canadian troops would have been unable to detain combatants and would have
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Canada’s contribution to the ISAF mission and would have taken a significant
NATO troop contributor off the battlefield.98 Even after its win in the litigation, the
Canadian government’s Afghan detention policy remains under significant political
pressure in light of allegations that the government knew that IRoA mistreated de-
tainees at the time that Canada handed its detainees to IRoA. Opposition members
of the Canadian Parliament have held hearings and are demanding access to
unredacted versions of relevant military records.99 In view of this intense public
scrutiny, it seems safe to assume that Canadian forces in Afghanistan are choosing
to detain few, if any, individuals on the battlefield out of concern that their troops
will have nowhere to transfer the detainees. The litigation thus appears indirectly
to have had a significant impact on Canadian detention policy.
Litigation has had an even more direct impact on UK detention policy. The
death penalty appears to be the third rail for the ECtHR, such that any transfers of
detainees who might realistically face the death penalty are certain to be deemed
unlawful by that court. This suggests that any State party in that situation will seek
death penalty assurances from the receiving State, even if the transferring State’s
judgment is that it is unlikely to be able to obtain such assurances. Coupled with
concerns about mistreatment of transferred detainees, as in the Evans case, it seems
almost certain that as transfers get harder, States will reduce the number of individ-
uals they detain in the first place.100 It also means that States are placing additional
weight on their ability to monitor a detainee after he is transferred, something they
will not always be able to secure. Indeed, the Evans court placed explicit conditions
on the UK’s ability to continue to transfer detainees to certain NDS facilities; these
conditions include that
(i) all transfers must be made on the express basis . . . that the UK monitoring team is to
be given access to each transferee on a regular basis, with the opportunity for a private
interview on each occasion; [and] (ii) each transferee must in practice be visited and in-
terviewed in private on a regular basis.101
It seems fair to say that this transfer litigation has caused the United Kingdom to be
far more circumspect in detaining belligerents or civilians taking direct part in hos-
tilities in Afghanistan, and thus directly has impacted the way the UK conducts it-
self on the battlefield.
Claims about Intelligence Activities
It is difficult to predict the real-world implications if Binyam Mohamed succeeds
in his case against Jeppesen Dataplan. If a court found the company liable for
Mohamed’s alleged mistreatment during part of his time in detention (and implied
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a relationship between Jeppesen and the US government), it presumably would
have a chilling effect on other contractors who are deciding whether to perform
particular activities for the US government. It is difficult to say how much of a chill-
ing effect it would have, though. If the Supreme Court granted certiorari and
Mohamed won his case against Jeppesen in the United States, it seems very likely
that the UK courts would take that into account in the litigation before them. Like-
wise, if his UK litigation against Jeppesen results in any disclosure of confidential in-
formation about the rendition program, that would make it easier for his US lawyers
to use that information in US court and avoid the state secrets privilege by claiming
that the information already was public.102
The litigation by Mohamed seeking access to US intelligence reports in the
UK’s possession has the potential to affect intelligence sharing between the United
States and the United Kingdom. In a letter to the United Kingdom, former State
Department Legal Adviser John Bellinger wrote, “We want to affirm the public
disclosure of these documents is likely to result in serious damage to US national
security and could harm existing intelligence information-sharing arrangements
between our two Governments.”103 The Obama administration affirmed that
view.104 In the wake of the release of the seven paragraphs, a White House spokes-
man stated, “We’re deeply disappointed with the court’s judgement because we
shared this information in confidence and with certain expectations. As we
warned, the court’s judgement will complicate the confidentiality of our intelligence-
sharing relationship with the United Kingdom, and it will have to factor into our
decision-making going forward.”105 Because the two governments are unlikely to
say more publicly about how and the extent to which intelligence sharing may be
affected, it is difficult to assess the actual impact of the case. One might expect,
though, that intelligence officers of each government now may be aware that the
information they exchange with each other might be at risk of release to a court
(and eventually to the public), especially in legally contentious areas such as those
discussed here.
The Jeppesen litigation, the damages litigation against the United Kingdom by
former Guantanamo detainees and the Binyam Mohamed treatment litigation all
stem from allegations that the United Kingdom assisted the United States in ren-
dering and detaining individuals believed to be fighting the United States. As a gen-
eral matter, this seems likely to heighten the UK’s caution when cooperating with
the United States on sensitive issues, because the political, financial and resource-
related costs for the United Kingdom have been high, even if the plaintiffs ulti-
mately lose their cases. At a time when intelligence cooperation among allies is crit-
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Penumbral Effects
In addition to the specific real-world implications that flow from each set of litiga-
tion, there are a few other ways in which this type of litigation will affect how States
fight armed conflicts, particularly (but not exclusively) for European States.
First, this litigation sets precedent that litigants will use in future litigation asso-
ciated with non-international armed conflicts. Unlike decisions made exclusively
by the executive branches of governments, court decisions such as those in the
United Kingdom bind the government, not just in the specific cases before the
courts, but also in factually similar situations in the future. Of course, decisions in
the ECtHR create precedent not just for the State involved in the suit, but also for
all other States parties to the ECHR.
Second, the sheer quantum of litigation creates penumbral concerns about op-
erating in “gray areas” where the legal rules are not black and white. This may cause
European States to take the opposite approach from the one made famous by then–
Deputy Director of National Intelligence Michael Hayden, who stated, “We’re going
to live on the edge. . . . My spikes will have chalk on them. . . . We’re pretty aggres-
sive within the law.”106 Knowledge that courts have been reasonably sympathetic to
the extension of human rights rules to armed conflict cannot but cause States to
think hard when considering establishing a policy that may not be consistent with
human rights principles, even if it is consistent with the law of war.
Third, if one State in a military coalition such as NATO loses a case and is forced
to change its policy, that almost certainly will affect the operations and policies of
other States within that coalition, as well as non-coalition States involved in the
conflict. For example, if a court concludes that State A, which is fighting a conflict
against non-State actors in State B, may not transfer detainees in its custody to
State B, State A is likely to have to rely on its coalition partners (or State B) to detain
individuals in the first instance. Thus, a litigation loss by one coalition partner may
affect another partner that itself has won similar litigation. Therefore, it is in the in-
terest of those challenging State practices during armed conflict to litigate in as
many fora as possible in order to increase the likelihood of success and of having a
policy and operational impact greater than the actual litigation victory.
IV. Reasons for Divergence and Future Steps
Part II identified a series of cases and a trend within US courts to limit litigation
about decisions made by the United States (as well as other States and contractors)
during armed conflict, in contrast to a trend within UK courts and the ECtHR to
allow such litigation and to review (and often deem unlawful) the decisions and ac-
tions taken by the United Kingdom during armed conflict (or during activities
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related to the US conflict with al Qaeda). This Part considers possible reasons for
this divergence.107
Reasons for Diverging Outcomes in US and European Cases
One possible reason for the divergence is the strong tradition of deference in the
US system to the executive in areas of national security and armed conflict.108 Bol-
stered by doctrines such as the political question and act of state doctrines and the
rule of non-inquiry, courts generally have hesitated to step into certain areas that
are likely to have a direct impact on foreign policy decisions by the executive
branch. While the UK courts have used a doctrine of “justiciability” that is similar
to the US political question doctrine, it appears that in the past few years UK courts
have taken a more robust approach to judicial review of executive national security
decisions. For example, in A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, the
House of Lords held that the legal regime that permitted the United Kingdom to
detain certain terrorist suspects without trial was inconsistent with the ECHR.109
As one scholar has written, “The decision appears to presage a new judicial bold-
ness regarding national security—a sphere in which scrutiny by British courts has
traditionally been blunted by a self-imposed custom of judicial deference to the ex-
ecutive branch.”110 This stands in contrast to the traditional view of UK courts that
they should not
set aside administrative decisions save where they were aberrant or totally “unreason-
able”—a doctrine of judicial self-restraint that bit with particular force when national
security was at stake. The extent to which the [Human Rights Act] frees British courts
from these shackles by encouraging the use of the more intensive proportionality test
favored by the European Court of Human Rights has been the subject of considerable
controversy. Courts and commentators have expressed quite diverse views as to how
much deference should be extended to the policies of the executive and legislature by
courts charged with determining whether a given measure breaches an ECHR right.111
A second, related element that is fostering this divergence is the way in which
the United States and European States approach their international human rights
obligations. The US executive branch consistently has taken the position that the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)112 does not apply
extraterritorially. US courts accordingly have not sought to extend the application
of the ICCPR to US activity overseas. (Nor have courts determined that the treaty is
self-executing.) Indeed, given how cautious US courts have been in extending con-
stitutional rights extraterritorially, it is no surprise that the ICCPR has not served
as a mechanism for US litigants to persuade courts to apply human rights princi-
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Conversely, all States that are members of the Council of Europe (including all
European Union States) are parties to the ECHR, which essentially serves as a “bill
of rights” for these States, and which applies during both peacetime and war-
time.113 As has been discussed throughout this article, the ECHR contains an en-
forcement mechanism—the European Court of Human Rights—which hears and
decides cases brought by individuals against States parties (as well as by States
against other States). Decisions from the ECtHR (and from domestic European
courts interpreting the ECHR), including those discussed above, are a critical—
and underreported—factor affecting the rules by which Europeans have fought—
and will fight—conflicts. If European historical and political concerns about
armed conflict serve as a “pushing” mechanism away from conflict, the ECHR
serves as a “pulling” mechanism toward the increasing application of human rights
rules to warfighting. In the view of one scholar who has written on this issue, “Eu-
ropean governments increasingly have to take into account the possible effects of
the European Convention on military operations both at home and abroad.”114
Indeed, section 2(1) of the UK’s Human Rights Act requires UK courts, when
considering a question that arises in connection with an ECHR right, to consider
relevant ECtHR caselaw.115 Although ECtHR decisions do not constitute formally
binding precedent for UK courts, “the fact that a complainant unable to get a rem-
edy at the domestic level can take the matter to Strasbourg increases the pressure
on UK courts to produce outcomes consistent with European jurisprudence.”116
The HRA thus may account for reduced judicial deference in UK courts in areas
that traditionally did receive deference, such as national security decisions.
Others are more skeptical that the ECHR has played a major role in affecting Eu-
ropean warfighting. In this view, actions by European governments and their
armed forces are driven as much by a fear of triggering criminal law prohibitions,
including murder, torture and other offenses derived from their International
Criminal Court obligations, as by a concern about litigation in the ECtHR. Fur-
ther, some believe that using human rights principles to fill in gaps in the laws of
war may help win hearts and minds, and thus better achieve the States’ military
goals. Yet others believe that certain European States use the applicability of the
ECHR as an excuse not to undertake certain lawful, though politically unpopular,
activities, even though they may not be overly concerned about actually losing a
case before the ECtHR. It may even be the case that some government officials
hope, through the application of human rights rules, to make conflict harder to
fight, and thus to stem the frequency of conflict.
A third reason that the US government may prevail more often in its courts is
because the United States has a vibrant ongoing debate about national security is-
sues, with loud and persuasive voices on both sides of the political spectrum (as
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well as in the middle). Judges considering these types of cases have been exposed to
the whole range of arguments about why certain national security decisions are
sensible or indefensible. Although these arguments may not factor directly into a
judicial decision, atmospherics matter. Indeed, one might point to a wide range of
views among the federal judges considering detention cases (and identify a divide
loosely along partisan lines) as an illustration of the breadth of judges’ positions on
national security–related issues. In contrast, the United Kingdom (and other States
in Europe) appear to have fewer politicians, journalists and academics making
compelling public arguments about the importance of a robust national security
policy; the louder voices come from the human rights community. Judges, being
human, are influenced by what they do—and do not—hear. Thus, it may be the
case that the UK court decisions, which of late have tended to favor human rights
arguments over national security arguments, stem in part from the atmospherics
in the country, which largely are set by those who prioritize civil liberties over na-
tional security arguments.117
Ways to Mitigate the Divergence
It is beyond cavil that the type of litigation described above is having a very real im-
pact on how States are fighting conflicts. For those who have brought and won
their cases against States, this impact is all for the good. For States losing the cases,
this impact can be detrimental, particularly where the judicial decision insuffi-
ciently takes into account operational realities of armed conflict and thus leaves
States with no acceptable options. (This is not to suggest, however, that State offi-
cials should bear no accountability if they violate the law, as is discussed below.)
What steps might these States take to minimize the occurrence of this litigation
(and maximize their ability to win cases when litigation arises)?
A good first step would be for States’ political leadership to make the national
security arguments clearly and persuasively to their judges, parliamentarians and
the European publics. For European governments to gain greater support for de-
fense missions, they need to better educate their publics about why the current mil-
itary missions are important for European security. To date, they have been slow to
do so. For example, it took two years for German Chancellor Angela Merkel to give
a speech to the German parliament about Afghanistan (and Germany’s role in
ISAF) or to visit Afghanistan.118 Of course, it is the European parliaments that ulti-
mately must fund military expenditures, and that can offer constructive support or
open criticism of European participation in ISAF and other operations. European
cabinets should ensure that their parliamentarians are sufficiently briefed on vari-
ous threats; parliamentary concerns are a major reason that the German govern-
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domestic parliaments do not have access to important intelligence information.
France, for instance, lacks a parliamentary intelligence oversight committee.119
Even in States in which parliaments have not served as major stumbling blocks to
European participation in coalitions, parliaments that are well-educated about the
threats can serve as another bridge between the government and the public.
Another step—and an important one for the US government—would be to rec-
ognize the interconnectedness of this litigation and the fact that a State’s national
security policy decisions now have an impact that extends beyond that State’s
courts. The US and European governments should avoid, to the greatest extent
possible, surprising each other with changes in laws or with high-impact court de-
cisions. The best way to do this is to hold early consultations with close allies on
pending legislation or court cases that could affect how that State conducts itself
during armed conflict. For instance, Canada convened a meeting of ISAF partners
to describe a court case it faced regarding detention in Afghanistan. One can imag-
ine any of a number of other existing fora in which relevant State officials could
hold such discussions.
A final step—and one that will require further study—is to consider whether
certain principles drawn from counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine offer ways to
minimize litigation in the future. For example, one source of problems in the
transfer litigation is the weakness of the host government, which results both in
subpar detention facilities and in a weak domestic law enforcement system that is
unable to prosecute those who engage in detainee abuse. The US COIN manual
emphasizes the importance of building up the domestic institutions of the State
under challenge from insurgents.120 Doing so—creating better detention facilities,
better-trained guards and stronger prosecution systems—would improve the con-
ditions into which the United States and European States hope to transfer detain-
ees, and thus would reduce litigation in the transfer realm. Further, it should be
apparent to all States participating in ISAF that any legal violations or abuses com-
mitted by their troops are likely to come to light and are almost certain to under-
mine their COIN operations.121 With fewer actual (as opposed to falsely claimed)
violations, the quantum of litigation should fall as well. Finally, COIN doctrine
recognizes that ex gratia or solatia payments, made in sympathy or recognition of
someone’s loss during a conflict, may advance the cause of the State undertaking
COIN.122 These payments, which are distinct from claims payments, may serve to
diminish the impetus to bring legal claims against the State undertaking COIN.
States should consider other non-judicial mechanisms by which to hold them-
selves accountable. The mechanisms should be able to reflect operational realities
in wartime, including the need to preserve intelligence relationships, while ensur-
ing that the executive branches do not operate unchecked. These might include
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internal investigations by entities such as inspectors general, which are housed
within an agency, but independent from its leadership. These investigations could
produce classified and unclassified versions of reports, as well as recommenda-
tions, where appropriate, that individuals wronged by governmental conduct be
compensated. These might also include inquiries led by retired esteemed individu-
als such as retired federal judges (which appears similar to what the United King-
dom is considering in establishing an inquiry about its role in renditions). If seen as
credible and fair, these types of investigations could also stanch the flow of
litigation.
At the same time, an increased effort by the United States and European States
to embed journalists and otherwise document their own compliance with the law,
as well as to draw attention to violations of the law by non-State actors, may affect
the outcomes of specific cases and may also improve for States the wider atmo-
spherics surrounding the cases that non-State actors are bringing.
V. Conclusion
These cases illustrate that litigation is having an impact on how States currently
fight, and on how they will fight in the future. This is not to argue against all judicial
involvement in issues that implicate national security. It is to suggest, though, that
such involvement should be measured and cautious; court judgments, while often
addressing genuine problems with certain aspects of warfare, sometimes are
crafted in ways that are overly abstracted from the choices that the losing govern-
ments have to make. Nor is this to suggest that executive branch decisionmakers
should not have to comply with laws, regulations and related restrictions, or should
not face criminal sanctions when their behavior warrants it. It is to suggest the need
for the judiciary to act with restraint in this area, and to suggest that in some cases
there may be non-judicial mechanisms that are better tailored to thread the needle
between oversight and accountability, on one hand, and the need to preserve the
confidentiality of certain types of decision making and policies, on the other.
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therefore you can’t come into a United States courtroom to assert your rights. As advo-
cates we now need to look outside the United States. In the same way that the U.S. ad-
ministrations are looking outside the United States to justify their positions, we should
be looking outside the U.S. to hold them to account.
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vance of Europe? . . . Such questions are asked too rarely in our country. They do, however,
deserve answers—as part of a German and European debate on security policy that thinks in
strategic terms and provides more than hasty and short-lived responses to daily events.”).
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